The number of applications per applicant submitted to the Electronic Residency Application System (ERAS) has been increasing in recent years, with competitive specialties being affected the most. Integrated Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery (PRS) programs are among the most competitive to match into, and the correspondingly high number of applications per applicant strains the time and financial resources of all parties involved. Applicants are spending an average of $6,073 and up to $15,000 on applications and interview travel.
PURPOSE
The number of applications per applicant submitted to the Electronic Residency Application System (ERAS) has been increasing in recent years, with competitive specialties being affected the most. Integrated Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery (PRS) programs are among the most competitive to match into, and the correspondingly high number of applications per applicant strains the time and financial resources of all parties involved. Applicants are spending an average of $6,073 and up to $15,000 on applications and interview travel. 1 Meanwhile, residency program directors are also obligated to review a greater number of applications, over 2 or more interview dates, compounding an already substantial time commitment. In this study, we examine whether an increased number of applications confers a benefit to applicants.
METHODS
The authors analyzed annual data from the National Resident Matching Program and ERAS for integrated PRS programs since 2010 to assess the association between mean number of submitted applications and the match rate for that year, adjusted for the number of available positions. Overall, since 2010, there appears to be a statistically significant correlation (P = 0.005) between the mean number of applications and the match rate each year. However, if the match rate is adjusted for the increased number of positions available each year, there is no statistically significant relationship between percentage of programs applied to and match rate (P = 0.78).
RESULTS

The number of integrated PRS programs has increased
CONCLUSIONS
Although past studies have observed that individual applicants who matched into PRS applied to more programs, 1 our study suggests an increase in applications does not improve the overall chances of successfully matching. These results may be illustrated by the Prisoner's Dilemma of game theory. Game theory is used to create mathematical models of different economic settings. The Prisoner's Dilemma describes how all parties are worse off when individuals act in their own self-interest. In the case of the PRS residency match, as the median number of applications submitted rise, applicants increase their number of applications to keep up with the competition, despite the mutual benefit of all applicants reducing their total number of applications instead. This is because if most people are applying to many programs, that number of applications becomes the minimum number required to be competitive. Hence, there is no added benefit in applying to many programs if everyone is doing so, but it significantly increases the cost. While ERAS discourages high application numbers by increasing the cost per application in a stepwise fashion, this approach has not been effective. We suggest an application limit as a practical alternative.
